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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY
Public Administrator,25 read CPLR 210(b) as granting the injured
party an extension of eighteen months after the potential defendant's
death to initiate an action in the event that the statute of limitations
expired during that period.26  The appellate division, first depart-
ment, reversed, and held that CPLR 210(b), as did its predecessors,
tolls the statute of limitations for an eighteen-month period in the
event of the potential defendant's death.2 7
CPLR 214(7): Period of limitation is a condition precedent.
CPLR 214(7) states that an action to annul a marriage on
the ground of fraud must be commenced within three years of the
discovery of the fraud s.2  As with all periods of limitation, it
must be determined whether this statutory period constitutes a
statute of limitations or a condition precedent. If it is a statute of
limitations, it is only a limitation on the cause of action and must
be asserted as a defense. But, if it is a condition precedent, it is an
ingredient of the cause of action which the plaintiff must establish as
part of his case. If he cannot establish that the suit was
brought within the three-year period, the cause of action is
extinguished completely. A general test to ascertain the nature
of the period is to look to the common law. If the cause of
action was known at common law, the limiting period is merely a
statute of limitations. But, if a statute created the cause of action
and attached a limitation of time to the commencement of the action,
then the limitation period is a condition precedent.2 9
Although it seems that at common law there was no right to
annul a marriage on the ground of fraud, and, consequently, any
period of limitation would be a condition precedent,30 in the 1910 de-
cision of McNair v. McNair 3 1 it was ruled that this period was a
defense, which, if not raised, was waived. This position was
affirmed in 1959 in the case of Rogers v. Rogers.32
25 50 Misc. 2d 200, 266 N.Y.S.2d 873 (Sup. Ct Bronx County 1966).
26E.g., if the defendant died with one year left for the plaintiff to sue,
under prior law the plaintiff would have one year and eighteen months
from the date of the defendant's death in which to commence his action.
However, under the interpretation given CPLR 210(b) by the supreme
court in Schwartz, the plaintiff would only have a total of eighteen months
from the defendant's death in which to sue.27 Schwartz v. Public Adm'r, 27 App. Div. 2d 913, 278 N.Y.S.2d 968
(1st Dep't 1967) (memorandum decision).
28The section is based upon CPA § 49(9), and no change was intended
from the CPA. SECOND REP. 69; FnFrT REP. 55. Section 1750 of the Code
of Civil Procedure provided that an action to annul a marriage for fraud
could be initiated "at any time." This language was kept until the CPA
was amended in 1955. See N.Y. Sess. Laws 1955, ch. 257.
2D See McLaughlin, Annual Survey, New York Practice, 15 SYRACUSE
L. REv. 381, 393 (1963).
3OSee Montgomery v. Montgomery, 3 Barb. 132 (N.Y. Ch. 1848).31 140 App. Div. 226, 125 N.Y.S. 1 (2d Dep't 1910).
3219 Misc. Zd 487, 187 N.Y.S.2d 575 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1959).
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Recently, the Court of Appeals, in Romano v. Romano,33 held
that the three year period of limitation of CPLR 214(7) was,
indeed, a condition precedent. As a result of this decision, it may
safely be surmised that CPLR 203(f), the alternative discovery
section, which apparently functions only where the statutory period
is considered a statute of limitations, is inapplicable to an action
brought to annul a marriage on the ground of fraud .3
ARTICLE 3 - JURISDICTION AND SERvicE, APPEARANCE AND CHOICE
OF COURT
CPLR 301: Doing business doctrine liberalized.
In Frumner v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc.,35 the plain-
tiff, a New York resident, sued three defendants: Hilton Hotels
Limited [Hilton *(U.K.)], a British Corporation; Hilton Hotels
International; and Hilton Hotels Corporation. The last two were
Delaware corporations doing business in New York. The suit arose
from personal injuries sustained by plaintiff at Hilton's (U.K.)
hotel in England.
Hilton (U.K.), the lessee and operator of the hotel, moved to
dismiss plaintiff's complaint for personal injuries on the ground
that the court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendant. The
Court of Appeals, affirming a denial of the motion, found that
Hilton (U.K.), though it had no New York office, bank account
or telephone number, had certain minimum contacts with the State
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the New York courts. The
Court found that the Hilton Reservation Service, a separate cor-
poration doing business in New York, did all the business which
Hilton (U.K.) would have done had it been represented in New
York by its own officials. 6 The common ownership of Hilton
(U.K.) and the Reservation Service gave rise to an inference of
broad agency powers on the part of the Reservation Service. This
justified a conclusion that Hilton (U.K.) was "present" within
the meaning of CPLR 301.
8 19 N.Y.2d 444, 227 N.E.2d 389, 280 N.Y.S.2d 570 (1967) (affirming
the appellate division, fourth department).
347B McKINNEYS CPLR 214(7), supp. commentary 56 (1966).
35 19 N.Y.2d 533, 227 N.E.2d 851, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41 (1967).8GAccording to the majority, the Service did publicity and public rela-
tions work for Hilton (U.K.) and other Hilton Hotels. It also accepted
and confirmed room reservations for the various Hilton Hotels. The dis-
sent apparently believed that the Service only "'confirn[s] availabilities'
at various hotels (not merely Hilton Hotels) 'based on forecasts supplied
by the hotels."' Frummer v. Hilton Hotels International, Inc., 19 N.Y.2d
533, 541, 227 N.E.2d 851, 856, 281 N.Y.S.2d 41, 48 (1967). Compare
Miller v. Surf Properties, Inc., 4 N.Y.2d 475, 151 N.E.2d 874, 176
N.Y.S.2d 318 (1958).
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